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INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE 
Amicus curiae Terry S. Kogan is Professor of 
Law at the S.J. Quinney College of Law, University 
of Utah. For more than two decades, Professor 
Kogan’s scholarship has explored the difficulties 
faced by transgender people in using sex-separated 
public restrooms. His recent work explores the histo-
ry of laws in the United States mandating sex-
segregation in public restrooms. That scholarship 
reveals that such laws, first enacted in the late nine-
teenth century, were not based on anatomical differ-
ences between men and women, but rather on an ar-
chaic vision of women as weak, vulnerable, and 
therefore in need of protective spaces whenever they 
entered the public realm. This brief will assist the 
Court by placing interpretation of Title IX and its 
implementing regulation in historical context.1 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This amicus curiae brief challenges two funda-
mental assumptions that underlie arguments in 
support of the Petitioner: 
1. Public restrooms are separated by sex 
because of anatomical differences between 
men and women; and 
                                               
1 No party or its counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and no person or entity other than the amicus curiae or his 
counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or 
submission of this brief. Counsel of record for the parties have 










2. Public restrooms have been separated by 
sex throughout history. 
Petitioner relies on “the (until now) universally 
accepted practice of separating restrooms . . . based 
on physiological differences between the sexes.” Pet. 
Br. 20. Amici supporting Petitioner have similarly 
rested on these assumptions. See, e.g., Br. of Gail 
Heriot & Peter Kirsanow, Members, U.S. Comm’n on 
Civ. Rights 2 (“Up until very recently, there was a 
strong, consensus-driven, American custom that 
public toilets . . . were separated on the basis of sex. 
No law required this . . . .”). So, too, did Judge Nie-
meyer’s dissenting opinion in the Court below: 
Across societies and throughout history, it 
has been commonplace and universally ac-
cepted to separate public restrooms, locker 
rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of 
biological sex in order to address privacy 
and safety concerns arising from the biolog-
ical differences between males and fe-
males.2 
These assumptions, however, are not well-
founded. First, there simply is no cross-historical 
common social practice related to multi-user public 
restrooms. Multi-user public restrooms—at the cen-
ter of this litigation—are a relatively modern devel-
opment; they did not even exist in the United States 
until the 1870s when advances in public works tech-
                                               
2 Pet. App. 50a. See also District Court Mem. Opinion, Pet. 
App. 111a (“Restrooms and locker rooms are designed different-










nology enabled effluence to be transferred through 
municipal sewer systems. Until then, bathrooms in 
both homes and public spaces were all single-user 
privies, water closets, and outhouses. Second, the 
first laws mandating that public restrooms be segre-
gated by sex, adopted in the late nineteenth century, 
were not based on differences between male and fe-
male anatomies or any necessity of functionality or 
design arising therefrom. Rather, nineteenth century 
toilet laws were grounded in then-contemporary un-
derstandings of gender roles known as the “separate 
spheres” ideology. Women were viewed as uniquely 
suited to the private home and domestic affairs, 
while the public sphere was seen as the exclusive 
domain of men. Developed in response to women’s 
expanded participation in public life and their re-
sulting need for bathrooms outside the home, early 
laws requiring sex-segregated public bathrooms re-
flected and reinforced this ideology. 
That contemporary sex-segregated restrooms can 
be traced directly to social norms regarding gender 
roles, rather than anatomical differences between 
men and women, demonstrates the illegitimacy of 
restroom policies that single out transgender stu-
dents for disparate, discriminatory treatment pur-
portedly on the basis of such anatomical distinctions. 
This Court should therefore reject an interpretation 
of the term “sex” such as that proposed by the Peti-
tioner, which would be “determin[ed] . . . with refer-
ence exclusively to genitalia,” Pet. App. 20a, and 
hold that Title IX and 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 require 
schools to provide access to restrooms congruent 










The decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reinstating Respondent’s Title IX claim should 
be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Historical Background on Public  
Restrooms 
Until the late nineteenth century all toilets—
both in public places and in homes—were single-user 
water closets, privies, or outhouses that emptied into 
“privy vaults” or cesspools located on the property.3 
Because public works systems capable of delivering 
water to private homes were not constructed in most 
United States cities until the late 1870s, few homes 
had running water.4 With the exception of those be-
longing to the wealthy, homes did not have indoor 
bathrooms as we know them today. Even among the 
better off, “despite the growing bourgeois devotion to 
sanitation in person and in the kitchen, the outdoor 
privy was still the norm in polite society.”5 
As a result of deadly cholera epidemics during 
the Civil War and the post-war development of the 
germ theory of disease, Americans began to under-
stand that sickness was brought about by unsanitary 
                                               
3 Maureen Ogle, ALL THE MODERN CONVENIENCES: AMERICAN 
HOUSEHOLD PLUMBING, 1840–1890, at 48 (Johns Hopkins Univ. 
Press 1996). 
4 Suellen Hoy, CHASING DIRT 65 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995). 










conditions and to take hygiene seriously. In the 
1870s, in response to these public health concerns, 
reformers known as “sanitarians” focused attention 
on replacing the haphazard and unsanitary plumb-
ing arrangements in homes and workplaces with 
technologically advanced public sewer systems.6 By 
1890, extensive public waterworks connected private 
homes to municipal water systems, and municipali-
ties began to adopt plumbing codes and similar regu-
lations.7 
 Advances in plumbing technology came even 
later to factories and workplaces. Though there is 
clear evidence of multi-user restrooms in factories 
after the turn of the twentieth century,8 reports of 
factory inspectors at the same time made clear that 
single-user toilets—water-closets, privies, and out-
houses—remained commonplace in American facto-
                                               
6 See Ogle, ALL THE MODERN CONVENIENCES at 3–6. 
7 See Samuel W. Abbott, The Past and Present Condition of 
Public Hygiene and State Medicine in the United States, in XIX 
MONOGRAPHS ON AMERICAN SOCIAL ECONOMICS 37 (Herbert B. 
Adams & Richard Waterman, Jr., eds., Dep’t of Soc. Econ. for 
the United States Comm’n to the Paris Exposition of 1900, 
1900). 
8 See George M. Price, THE MODERN FACTORY: SAFETY, 
SANITATION AND WELFARE 280 (John Wiley & Sons 1914) (pho-
tograph of toilets in a multi-user restroom captioned, “Well Ar-
ranged, Sanitary Water-closets”); J.J. Cosgrove, Factory Sani-
tation, in FACTORY SANITATION, at xii (Standard Sanitary Mfg. 
Co. 1913) (photograph of toilets in multi-user restroom cap-











ries through most of the nineteenth century.9 Moreo-
ver, such single-user toilets were generally used by 
both men and women.10 As discussed below, the late 
nineteenth century legal requirement that restroom 
facilities be separated by sex and so designated de-
veloped as a result of Victorian-era morals legisla-
tion that relied on then-prevailing ideology concern-
ing the proper gender roles of men and women. 
II. Sex-Segregated Restrooms Grew Out of 
the “Separate Spheres” Ideology of the 
Victorian Era  
A. The “Separate Spheres” Ideology 
In the early nineteenth century, the industrial 
revolution drove many men to leave the homestead 
                                               
9 An investigator for the New York State Factory Commission 
commented on the general condition of factory toilet facilities in 
1914: “No part of an industrial establishment is so neglected as 
the toilet accommodations. In many cases they are located out-
side of the factory, causing the loss of much time and also en-
dangering the health of the employes [sic] . . . . Many of the toi-
lets were not separated for the sexes and were of an obsolete 
and crude type. In a large number of factories in rural commu-
nities the unsanitary privy is still being used . . . .” Price, THE 
MODERN FACTORY at 275. 
10 See, e.g., id.; Men’s Ready-Made Clothing, in 2 REPORT ON 
CONDITION OF WOMAN AND CHILD WAGE-EARNERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 61-645, at 499 (prepared under the 
direction of Chas. P. Neill, Comm’r of Labor 1911) (quoting 
James Connolly & John Franey, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE FACTORY INSPECTORS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 26 
(1888)) (“The water-closets are used alike by males and fe-










for work in factories while women remained in the 
home, rearing children and performing domestic 
work. This economic restructuring led to the for-
mation of a “separate spheres” ideology—the notion 
that the public realm was the proper place for men 
and the private home the proper place for women.11 
Coupled with this ideology was a view of women as 
uniquely virtuous and moral.12  
Despite this vision of the proper social role for 
women, the demands of a burgeoning economy soon 
pushed many women from the privacy of the home 
into the workplace. Women also moved into the civic 
life of the community, becoming active in social re-
form and suffrage movements. Nonetheless, the sep-
arate spheres ideology persisted, and the growing 
number of women in public spaces evidenced a “liv-
ing contradiction” of the Victorian era’s “cult of true 
womanhood.”13 Legislators feared that allowing 
                                               
11 See Terry S. Kogan, Sex Separation: The Cure-All for Victori-
an Social Anxiety, in TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE 
POLITICS OF SHARING 146 (Harvey Molotch & Laura Norén, 
eds., New York Univ. Press 2010). 
12 See David E. Shi, FACING FACTS: REALISM IN AMERICAN 
THOUGHT AND CULTURE 1850–1920, at 17 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1995) (describing the emerging faith “in the civilizing power of 
moral women” during the nineteenth century). “Females were 
widely assumed to be endowed with greater moral sensibility 
and religious inclinations than men.” Id.  
13 Kogan, Sex Separation: The Cure-All for Victorian Social 
Anxiety, in TOILET at 147 (quoting Cynthia Eagle Russett, 
SEXUAL SCIENCE: THE VICTORIAN CONSTRUCTION OF 
WOMANHOOD 10 (Harvard Univ. Press 1989)); see also Terry S. 
Kogan, How Did Public Bathrooms Get to Be Separated by Sex 










women into the factory would endanger both wom-
en’s bodies and the welfare of future generations.14 
To counter this threat, legislators began enacting pa-
ternalistic legislation that restricted women’s ability 
to work and to participate in other activities viewed 
as incompatible with women’s unique social role.15  
Some of these laws banned women from profes-
sions deemed inherently dangerous, such as mining, 
jobs requiring heavy lifting, and cleaning moving 
machinery.16 Other laws controlled the conditions 
under which women could work—limiting hours of 
employment,17 mandating a rest period for women 
                                                                                                
https://theconversation.com/how-did-public-bathrooms-get-to-
be-separated-by-sex-in-the-first-place-59575. The “cult of true 
womanhood” describes attributes “by which a woman judged 
herself and was judged by her husband, her neighbors and so-
ciety,” namely piety, purity, submissiveness and domesticity. 
Barbara Welter, DIMITY CONVICTIONS: THE AMERICAN WOMAN 
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 21 (Ohio Univ. Press 1976). 
14 Terry S. Kogan, Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms: Law, 
Architecture, and Gender, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 27 (2007). 
15 Id. at 27–28. 
16 Id. at 14; Mary Elizabeth Pidgeon, BULL. OF THE WOMEN’S 
BUREAU, NO. 91, WOMEN IN INDUSTRY 55–56 (U.S. Dep’t of La-
bor 1935). See also, e.g., Act of Mar. 27, 1872, § 6, 1872 Ill. Laws 
568, 570 (forbidding women from working in mines). Kansas 
adopted a more general law prohibiting women from working in 
any industry or occupation “under conditions of labor detri-
mental to their health or welfare.” Act of May 22, 1915, ch. 275, 
§ 10496, 1915 Kan. Sess. Laws 2147.  
17 Kogan, Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms, 14 MICH. J. 










during the work day,18 requiring that seats be pro-
vided for women workers,19 and prohibiting women 
from working immediately before or after child-
birth.20 Regulation of women’s work extended be-
yond restrictions on physically-demanding occupa-
tions. For example, other statutes barred women 
from professions such as the practice of law and jus-
tified these restrictions with reference to the “[t]he 
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which be-
longs to the female sex.” Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 
(16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).21  
                                               
18 See, e.g., Act of Mar. 31, 1915, ch. 350, § 4, 1915 Me. Laws. 
367, 368. 
19 See, e.g., Act of May 18, 1881, ch. 298, 1881 N.Y. Laws 402.  
20 See, e.g., Act of May 26, 1913, ch. 112, 1913 Conn. Pub. Acts 
1701; Act of Apr. 15, 1912, ch. 331, sec. 1, § 93-a, 1912 N.Y. 
Laws 660. Contemporary anti-discrimination law, of course, 
recognizes that such legislation is a product of outmoded gen-
der stereotyping. For example, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission’s sex discrimination guidelines now provide 
that state laws prohibiting or limiting “the employment of fe-
males in certain occupations, in jobs requiring the lifting or 
carrying of weights exceeding certain prescribed limits, during 
certain hours of the night, for more than a specified number of 
hours per day or per week, and for certain periods of time be-
fore and after childbirth . . . do not take into account the capaci-
ties, preferences, and abilities of individual females and, there-
fore, discriminate on the basis of sex.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b)(1). 
21 Such attitudes towards women’s roles have been repeatedly 
rejected by this Court for at least the last half-century. See, e.g., 
Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 
(1991) (noting that “[c]oncern for a woman’s existing or poten-
tial offspring historically has been the excuse for denying wom-










This nineteenth century “separate spheres” ide-
ology also led to reconfiguring the architectural sites 
that women inhabited outside the home, as ever 
more public spaces were designated for the exclusive 
use of women. A separate ladies’ reading room with 
furnishings that resembled those of a private home 
became an accepted part of American public library 
design.22 Beginning in the 1840s, American railroads 
began designating a “ladies’ car” for the exclusive 
use of women and their male escorts.23 By the end of 
the nineteenth century, women-only parlor spaces 
had been created in other establishments, including 
photography studios, hotels, post offices, banks and 
department stores.24 As discussed below, it was in 
this spirit of manipulating public space to carve out 
                                                                                                
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (explaining that such laws were “ra-
tionalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in 
practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage”). 
This extends to legislation based on stereotypes about women’s 
physical abilities. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U.S. 718, 725 & n.10 (1982) (rejecting such laws as “illegit-
imate” and noting that “the many protective labor laws enacted 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries often had as their ob-
jective the protection of weaker workers, which the laws as-
sumed meant females”); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 
479 U.S. 272, 290 (1987) (characterizing early twentieth centu-
ry “protective labor legislation” as “reflect[ing] archaic [and] 
stereotypical notions about pregnancy and the abilities of preg-
nant workers”). 
22 Kogan, Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms, 14 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. at 30–31. 
23 Id. at 31–32. 










separate, ostensibly protective spaces for women 
that legislators enacted the first laws mandating 
that public restrooms be separated by sex. 
B. Early Bathroom Laws Were 
Examples of “Separate Spheres” 
Legislation 
Laws in the United States mandating sex-
separated public restrooms were first enacted in the 
late nineteenth century and were directed at facto-
ries and other workplaces. These laws often amend-
ed existing protective labor legislation aimed unique-
ly at women and children.25 The first such law was 
passed in Massachusetts in 1887.26 By 1920, forty-
three states had enacted legislation regulating pub-
lic bathrooms.27 Any suggestion that these laws were 
adopted for gender-neutral reasons related to biology 
is belied by the titles given to many of these laws, 
which make explicit their paternalistic goals. For 
example, the 1911 Ohio factory restroom law 
                                               
25 See, e.g., Act of May 25, 1887, ch. 462, sec. 4, § 13, 1887 N.Y. 
Laws 575, 577 (amending “An act to regulate the employment 
of women and children in manufacturing establishments” to re-
quire that “water-closets used by female shall be separate and 
apart from those used by males”).  
26 Act of Mar. 24, 1887, ch. 103, § 2, 1887 Mass. Acts 668, 669 
(“An Act to secure proper sanitary provisions in factories and 
workshops”). 
27 See George Martin Kober, History of Industrial Hygiene and 
its Effect on Public Health, in A HALF CENTURY OF PUBLIC 











amended an act titled, “An act for the preservation of 
the health of female employes [sic].”28 Similarly, a 
1919 North Dakota Law related to factory toilets 
was titled “An Act to Protect the Lives and Health 
and Morals of Women and Minor Workers.”29 
A review of the turn of the century literature ad-
dressing factory sanitation leaves little doubt that a 
central justification for providing separate spaces for 
women in workplaces—water-closets, resting rooms, 
and dressing rooms—was women’s perceived special 
vulnerabilities.30 Separate rooms were designated 
for women workers to accommodate their supposed 
increased susceptibility to dizziness, fainting, and 
                                               
28 Act of May 31, 1911, sec. 1, § 1009, 1911 Ohio Laws 488. 
29 Act of Mar. 6, 1919, ch. 174, 1919 N.D. Laws 317. See also 
Act of Jan. 22, 1897, ch. 98, 1897 Tenn. Pub. Acts 247 (“An Act 
to require employers of females to provide separate water-
closets for them”); Act of Mar. 3, 1913, ch. 240, 1913 S.D. Sess. 
Laws 332 (“An Act to Regulate the Employment of Women and 
Girls and Children Within This State”). 
30 See, e.g., C. F. W. Doehring, Factory Sanitation and Labor 
Protection, in 44 BULL. OF THE DEP’T OF LABOR, H.R. Doc. No. 
57-370, at 1–2 (1903) (“Women suffer even more than men from 
the stress of such circumstances [in unsanitary factories], and 
more readily degenerate. A woman’s body is unable to with-
stand strains, fatigues, and privations as well as a man’s.”); see 
also id. at 28 (quoting Dr. Thomas Oliver) (“Where the two sex-
es are as far as possible equally exposed to the influence of 
lead, women probably suffer more rapidly, certainly more se-
verely, than men. To a certain extent the reason is to be found 
in the fact that lead exercises an injurious influence upon the 










hysteria.31 Similar to women-only rail cars and li-
brary reading rooms, these were designed as spaces 
to which women could retreat when overcome by the 
physical and emotional stresses that legislators of 
the era viewed as unique to women when they en-
tered public spaces. 
Victorian concepts of privacy and modesty also 
informed the design of multi-user factory bathrooms. 
Factory inspectors expressed concern about male 
workers observing any aspect of women’s toilet use. 
For example, a cotton mill inspector critiqued the 
lack of a “reasonable privacy of approach” to water 
closets in many mills—i.e., privacy not only within 
the restroom, but in entering the restroom—and fa-
cilities where “the feet and lower parts of the skirts 
of females occupying the water closets can be seen 
from the workrooms.”32  
                                               
31 See George M. Price, Joint Bd. of Sanitary Control in the 
Dress & Waist Indus., SPECIAL REPORT ON SANITARY 
CONDITIONS IN THE SHOPS OF THE DRESS AND WAIST INDUSTRY 
13 (1913) (“In the shops where there are a large number of girls 
working, it is probable that there are a number likely to have 
sudden attacks of dizziness, fainting or other symptoms of ill-
ness, for whose use provision should be made in the form of rest 
or emergency rooms.”); see also Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, 
DISORDERLY CONDUCT 197–216 (Oxford Univ. Press 1985) (dis-
cussing hysteria as a condition considered unique to women in 
nineteenth century culture). 
32 Cotton Textile Industry, in 1 REPORT ON CONDITION OF 
WOMAN AND CHILD WAGE EARNERS IN THE UNITED STATES, S. 
Doc. No. 61-645, at 371 (prepared under the direction of Chas. 
P. Neill, Comm’r of Labor 1910). An inspector described sex-
separated bathrooms located next to each other and entered by 










The requirement in factory bathroom laws that 
water-closets be “separate and distinct”33 and that 
there be “privacy of approach” thus reflected deep-
seated notions of Victorian modesty which were 
themselves part of the broader social anxiety over 
men and women working together in the same space. 
As one factory inspector noted: 
Where men and women are thus constantly 
associated it is, of course, possible for im-
moral relations between them to spring up . 
. . . In many mills . . . there is no privacy of 
approach to the toilets, and anyone enter-
ing them does so in full view of persons of 
both sexes in the same workroom, a condi-
tion obviously not in the interest of good 
morals.34 
Texts discussing factory sanitation practices sim-
ilarly reflect the belief that separating public re-
strooms by sex was necessary to foster and maintain 
the “cult of true womanhood.”35 In a 1913 essay pub-
lished by one of the country’s major manufacturers 
of plumbing equipment, a sanitary engineer called 
                                                                                                
as “delinquent with reference to the lack of privacy of ap-
proach.” Men’s Ready-Made Clothing, in 2 REPORT ON 
CONDITION OF WOMAN AND CHILD WAGE-EARNERS, at 335.  
33 E.g., Act of Mar. 24, 1887, ch. 103, § 2, 1887 Mass. Acts 668, 
669. 
34 Cotton Textile Industry, in 1 REPORT ON CONDITION OF 
WOMAN AND CHILD WAGE EARNERS, at 590. 










for “separate accommodations” which were required 
by “moral decency” in spaces “where males and fe-
males are employed.”36 Though set forth in a tech-
nical essay on factory plumbing and sanitation, the 
essay implored factory owners to “[t]reat other men’s 
daughters . . . as you would like them [to] treat 
yours,”37 invoking a paternalistic vision of women as 
innocent and vulnerable. Like women’s reading 
rooms in Victorian public libraries designed to recre-
ate domestic spaces, the factory restroom for women 
called for by the essay was “[s]uggestive of all the 
comfort, cleanliness and convenience of a bath room 
in the home.”38  
Laws mandating sex-separated toilet facilities 
thus represented an effort to reconcile the early 
nineteenth century vision that women belonged in 
the domestic sphere with the conflicting realities of 
life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries. The “separate spheres” ideology portrayed 
women as virtuous, vulnerable, and in need of the 
protection of the homestead. As women left the home 
for factories and other workplaces, legislators enact-
ed laws to cordon off exclusive spaces for women that 
could serve as surrogates for the homestead in the 
public realm. Among those newly regulated spaces 
intended to protect supposedly weak and vulnerable 
women was the sex-segregated restroom. 
                                               
36 Cosgrove, Factory Sanitation, in FACTORY SANITATION, at ix. 
37 Id. 










III. The History of Sex-Segregated Restrooms 
Demonstrates that Transgender Students 
Should Have Access to Restrooms that 
Comport with their Gender Identities 
Petitioner claims that “Title IX’s architects de-
liberately allowed separation of the sexes to protect 
privacy—an interest rooted in physical differences 
between the sexes . . . .” Pet. Br. 21.39 As the history 
outlined in this brief demonstrates, however, the 
complex web of social norms and interests that led to 
sex segregation of public restrooms in the nineteenth 
century were not considerations “rooted in” distinc-
tions between male and female anatomy. To the con-
trary, sex segregation of public restrooms arose as 
an expression of a particular ideological vision of 
                                               
39 The cases Petitioner cites in attempting to demonstrate that 
this Court has “always focused on physiological differences” in 
cases implicating the “privacy interests” Petitioner ostensibly 
seeks to advance (Pet. Br. 35) provide no support for its posi-
tion. The cited portions of City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & 
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) and Tuan Anh Nguyen 
v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) involve physiological differences but 
have nothing to do with privacy or with the “lawful separation 
of males and females” (Pet. Br. 35). See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 
707 (noting, as an example of a “real” rather than “fictional dif-
ference between women and men,” the fact that “[w]omen, as a 
class, do live longer than men”); Tuan Anh Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 
63 (“[F]athers and mothers are not similarly situated with re-
gard to the proof of biological parenthood.”). And while the cited 
language in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 n.19 
(1996) gestures, in dicta, towards recognizing privacy interests 
as a basis for maintaining sex-segregated living arrangements, 
it nowhere purports to ground those privacy interests in physio-











men’s and women’s gender roles that is not reducible 
to such anatomical distinctions. 
The sex-segregated public restroom, first man-
dated by laws in the late nineteenth century, has be-
come a pervasive architectural feature of contempo-
rary America that is unlikely to disappear any time 
soon. Title IX and its implementing regulations rec-
ognize, and do not seek to alter, this arrangement. 
Understanding the origins of this social convention 
in the United States, however, illustrates that sepa-
rating such facilities by sex was not simply a natu-
ral, neutral response to anatomical differences, but 
rather an ideological cultural response that reflected 
and reinforced the prevailing gender norms of the 
time. 
Arguments that seek to justify the disparate 
treatment of transgender students as a byproduct of 
purportedly neutral, anatomically-based rules disre-
gard this history. Such arguments improperly seek 
to insulate these discriminatory policies from mean-
ingful judicial review, suggesting—incorrectly—that 
these policies simply reflect a “natural” division of 
restrooms based on so-called “biological sex.” As a 
more accurate historical understanding helps make 
clear, excluding transgender students from the pub-
lic restrooms that are congruent with their gender 
identities is a discriminatory practice that reflects 
and enacts social stigmatization of those students. 
See Resp. Br. 29 (“The Board’s policy sends a mes-
sage to Gavin and the entire school community that 
Gavin is unacceptable and not fit to use the same re-










sistent with history and precedent, that Title IX pro-
vides redress for such discriminatory conduct.  
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 
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